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In the corporate finance literature, there are two theories of capital structure that are relevant: the
trade-off theoryandthepeckingordertheory. The trade-off theoryarguesthatfirmschoosetheoptimal
levelof debtbytradingoff the benefits of debtagainstits costs. The benefits of debtincludetaxdeduct-
ibility of interest expenses and a reduction in agency costs of equity derived from excess free cash
flows.The costs of debt are mainlybankruptcycosts, either direct or indirect, and these may occur in a
situation of excessive debt. According to this theory, there is an optimal level of debt which occurs
when the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of an additional unit of debt.
The pecking order theory is an alternative and more recent theory of capital structure. This theory ar-
gues that a pecking order in financing exists if there are information asymmetriesbetweenthe insiders
(either large shareholders or managers), and outsiders (mainly small shareholders or other investors
of the company). In such case, the cost of issuing new securities is the most important issue and it
goes beyond a discussion of benefits and costs of debt. The main prediction of this theory is that there
is a hierarchy of financing sources. Hence, firms prefer to use retained earnings as their first financing
source, followed by debt and, lastly, by equity. Equity is less interesting to firms, given that it entails
larger information asymmetry costs, making its issuance more expensive relative to other funding
sources.
The aim of this work is to look at decisions affecting capital structure in the Portuguese corporate sec-
tor. In other words,wediscuss whetherthe leverageof firms followsmore closelythe predictionsof the
trade-off model and/or the pecking order model. The data used comes from the Banco de Portugal
Central Balance Sheet database and covers the period from 1990 to 2007. This database collates ac-
counting information on non-financial firms as well as other data such as the age of the firm and the
number of employees.
We observea significantnegativerelationbetweenprofitabilityandleverage,whichsupports thepeck-
ing order theory. However, we also observe that firms converge rapidly to their target leverage ratios,
thus providing evidence in favour of the trade-off theory. We think these results may not be conflicting
as they could refer to decisions made with different time-horizons in mind.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the trade-off and the pecking order theories
and discusses their main predictionson leverageratios. Section 3 characterizesleveragein the Portu-
guese corporate sector using aggregate data and firm-level data. The next Section presents our em-
pirical methodology and main results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the article.
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Since Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance proposition, firm’s capital structure decisions have
been intensely investigated. The irrelevance proposition states that under strict assumptions, among
whichis the absence of taxes, capital structure is irrelevant to the determination of a company’s value.
The assumption on taxes proved to be crucial for the irrelevance proposition. In fact, a few years later,
Modigliani and Miller (1963) concluded that the introduction of corporate taxes and the possibility of
deducting interest on debt from taxable profits would induce firms to be completely financed by debt.
However, as this is not usually observed, several authors, including Modigliani and Miller themselves
(1963),arguedthat bankruptcycosts, andother costs associatedwithdebt couldexplainwhyfirms are
not totally financed by debt. This discussion on the benefits and costs of debt is central to the trade-off
theory of capital structure. According to this theory, there are forces leading firms to less leverage, for
instance bankruptcy costs, and forces leading to more leverage, among them the above-mentioned
tax benefits of debt and agency costs. The combination of these forces results in the existence of a
target leverage at which the value of firms is maximized.
The main predictions of this theory on leverage ratios are related with the profitability of firms. In fact,
profitability has a positive impact on leverage for three main reasons. First of all, as profitability in-
creases, bankruptcy costs decrease, pushing firms to higher levels of debt. Second, as DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980) argue, more profitable firms face higher expected tax rates than less or non-profitable
firms. This asymmetric taxation of profits and losses drives more profitable firms to higher levels of
debt as they would benefit more from the resulting tax benefits. Third, more profitable firms tend to
have more free cash flow, that is, more excess earnings over profitable investments. In the agency
models of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), the interests of managers and sharehold-
ers are not aligned and managers tend to waste free cash flow in perquisites and/or bad investments.
Insuchsituations,theexistenceofdebtpaymentshelpstoreduceagencycostsofequityasthesepay-
ments reduce excess cash in the firm. Besides profitability, there are other characteristics of firms that
helpto explaintarget leverages.Accordingto the theory, bankruptcycosts are expectedto be lowerfor
firms with more tangible assets as these could be used as collateral, in contrast to firms with more in-
tangible assets. In addition, the existence of depreciation expenses helps to explain less leverage as
these expenses result in tax benefits. Finally, in contrast with the above-mentioned agency models,
firms withmore investments wouldhave less free cash flowfor managers to allocate for their ownben-
efit. Hence, for firms withmore investments, debt is not as important as a wayto monitor and constrain
the actions of managers.
The pecking order theorywasdevelopedin Myers(1984), using the Myersand Majluf (1984) setting of
asymmetricinformation.In their model,the insidersof the firm, typicallythe managers,are assumedto
know more about the firm’s prospects than outside investors. Being privy to confidential information,
managers will issue risky securities only when they are overpriced (and will repurchase securities if
they are underpriced). However, as investors anticipate this type of behaviour from the managers of
the firm, they, the investors, willdiscount both newand the existing securities whennewissues of risky
securities are announced. As a result, managers may decide not to issue risky securities and possibly
foregoprofitableinvestmentsbecausethoseissuanceswouldbetooexpensive.Toavoiddistortionsof
investment decisions, the pecking order theory argues in favour of a hierarchy of financing. Firms are
likely to finance their investments primarily with internal financing to prevent the firm from being ex-
posed to the asymmetricinformation problem. If outside capital is needed,firms are likelyto issue debt
securities first, that is, those payinga predefinedremuneration,whichentails lowerrisk. Onlywhenthe
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2firm’s debt capacityis reached should the firm consider equity, as it is much riskier and investors would
factor in a bigger discount.
Some predictions of the pecking order are at odds with those of the trade-off theory. In the first place,
there is no target leverage, as each firm chooses its leverage ratio based on financing needs. Firms
choose to use debt only when internal funds are not enough to cover their investment needs and not
because there are benefits and costs from having debt. Secondly, profitable firms use less debt than
lessprofitableones.This effectderivesfromthefactthatmoreprofitablefirmscanfinancealargerpor-
tion of their activity with internally generated funds. Finally, holding profitability constant, leverage is
higher for firms with higher investments, as firms need to issue debt when investment exceeds inter-
nally generated earnings. In a more complex version of the theory, firms may be considering not only
the present needs but also future needs of financing. In such cases, it is possible that firms with large
expectedinvestmentswouldprefertomaintainsomefreedebtcapacitytoavoidhavingtorefuseprofit-
able investments in the future or having to finance these good projects with new risky securities. In
such cases, large expected investments help to explain less current leverage.
1
Although the theories are in contradiction as far as the prediction of the impact of profitability on lever-
age ratios is concerned, they agree on the impact of the volatility of profits on leverage ratios. For the
trade-off theory, the impact of volatilityis negative as it increases bankruptcycosts. For the pecking or-
der theory, firms withmore volatile cash flowsare also less likelyto have debt in order to lowerthe pos-
sibility that they will have to issue new risky securities or forego future profitable investments when
cash flows are insufficient.
There are two more recent explanations of capital structure decisions, the market timing theory by
Baker and Wurgler (2002) and the mechanical stock price explanation by Welch (2004). Baker and
Wurgler (2002) argue that managers tend to “time the market” by issuing shares when the equity mar-
ket is perceived as more favourable. This theory is in contrast with the pecking order hypothesis, as it
assumes that managers are able to exploit information asymmetries to benefit current shareholders.
On the other hand, as in the pecking order hypothesis, there is no reversion to a target capital ratio. To
testtheirtheory,BakerandWurglercomparethemarket-to-bookratiowiththecapitalthatfirmsraisein
the market. The Welch (2004) explanationof capital structure is based on share price fluctuations. Ac-
cordingto this explanation,managerssimplylet market leverageratios changebecauseof share price
fluctuations. However, given that most Portuguese firms are not publicly traded, testing these theories
with Portuguese data is not feasible and hence our analysis will focus on testing the first two
above-mentioned theories.
Against this setting, we empirically test whether leverage decisions in Portuguese firms follow the
trade-off or the pecking order theory. Hence, we will study (i) how the level of leverage changes with
firms’ profitability and other firms’ characteristics and (ii) if firms have an optimal target leverage to
which they converge.
3. LEVERAGE IN THE PORTUGUESE CORPORATE SECTOR
This section provides a characterization of the financial position of the Portuguese corporate sector.
The analysis is based on two main data sources: the national financial accounts and the Central Bal-
ance Sheet database. There are important differences in the compilation of data in the two sources,
mainly due to their coverage, valuation principles and definition of variables. In terms of coverage, the
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(1) For a more detailed discussion on the theory and empirical applications of capital structure decisions see Harris and Raviv (1991) and Fama and French
(2002), among others. 222national financial accounts data source covers the whole corporate sector while the Central Balance
Sheet database provides data on a sample of firms. As for valuation principles, national financial ac-
counts tend to privilege market values, while the Central Balance Sheet database relies mainly on
book values, although, for the recent past, some assets may be valued at market prices, following the
introduction of the international accounting standards. The Central Balance Sheet database provides
detailed accounting information on Portuguese firms, and is used mostly for economic and statistical
purposes. In this work, only annual data will be used, though quarterly data is also available for a
smaller set of firms. Reporting was not compulsory before 2006. Despite that, the database covers
around 60 per cent of total gross value added in the Portuguese economy up to 2005, with larger firms
being covered more exhaustively than small and medium-sized ones. Even though this bias consti-
tutes a shortcoming, the database is still an extremely rich and unique dataset on non-financial corpo-
rations. From 2006 onwards, the Central Balance Sheet database started to be filled in with
information reported within the IES (Simplified Corporate Information). The IES is the result of a joint
project by several entities (Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Ministry of Justice, Statistics
Portugal and Banco de Portugal). One advantage of the implementation of the IES is that it simplifies
the reporting process of firms to different entities by concentrating all reports in just one. In 2006, firms
were asked to report information for the previous fiscal year and, as a result, the information in the
Central Balance Sheet database from 2005 onwards refers to all companies operating in Portugal
instead of just to a representative sample.
Given these important differences in the collection of macro and micro data, it may not be possible to
alwayscompare statistics from the two data sources. However, both data sources provide relevant in-
formation. On one side, the national financial accounts provide information for the whole corporate
sector and privilege market values; on the other, the use of data from the Central Balance Sheet data-
baseenablesdifferencesinfirm size,economicsectorandageto betakenintoaccount.Moreover, the
use of micro-data allows for a deeper study of the determinants of corporate leverage, exploring
firm-level heterogeneity.
3.1. Using macro data
In Portugal, as in most European countries, banks play a central role in financing non-financial corpora-
tions. Between 1995 and 2007, bank loans were by far the largest source of external funds for firms, rep-
resenting more than 60 per cent of total debt during most of the period considered (Table 1).
Nevertheless, there was some increase in the share of debt financing through capital markets. Still, in
2007 debt securities issued by firms represented only 13 per cent of their total outstanding debt. More-
over, it is important to consider that a significant proportion of these debt securities is held by banks.
Trade credit is also a very important funding source, accounting for more than one quarter of the debt of
Portuguesenon-financialcorporations,eventhoughitsimportancehasbeenwaninginthelast decade.
The indebtedness of Portuguese firms has risen substantially during the last decade: whereas in 1995
loans, debt securities and trade credit of Portuguese non-financial corporations amounted to 60 per cent
of GDP, in 2007 this indebtedness ratio was almost twofold. The increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of
non-financial corporations in Portugal during this period was one of the largest among European coun-
tries (Chart1). As a result, Portuguese firms were, in 2007, amongst the most indebted. The debt-to-GDP
ratio of Portuguese companies was, in 2007, lower than that of Danish, Dutch, Swedish and Spanish
firms. There is a striking contrast with the relative position of Portuguese firms in this international com-
parison in 1995, when their indebtedness was below the European average. The increase in indebted-
ness of Portuguese firms reflected in part the decrease in interest rates in the 90’s, as a result of the
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4convergence process towards the European Monetary Union. In fact, interest paid by firms as a percent-
age of GDP remained relatively stable after 1999, following a period when it fell substantially.
In turn, the leverage ratio in Portuguese firms moved very differently from the debt-to-GDP ratio. The le-
verage ratio increased significantly during the late 90’s, but remained relatively stable afterwards, at val-
ues close to 35 per cent. Moreover, the leverage ratio of Portuguese firms is broadly in line with the
European average (Chart 2).
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Table 1





(a) (b) Total debt
(c) as a
percentage of GDP Loans Securities other
than shares
Trade credit
1995 56 8 36 - 60
1996 55 9 37 - 61
1997 5 3 8 3 92 36 2
1998 5 9 8 3 32 67 3
1999 6 0 9 3 12 78 0
2000 6 2 8 3 03 08 9
2001 6 3 8 2 83 39 8
2002 64 10 27 35 98
2003 66 8 26 35 102
2004 6 4 9 2 73 39 9
2005 63 11 26 33 104
2006 63 12 25 33 106
2007 64 13 23 33 114
Source: Eurostat (National Financial Accounts).
Notes:(a)Non-consolidated values(inpercentage). (b)Leverage istheratioof loansplussecuritiesotherthan sharestothesumofloans, securitiesotherthan shares,tradecreditand
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to the sum of loans, securities other than shares, trade credit and shares. Non-consoli-
dated values. Europe: average ratio for the selected countries. (*) The last value is for
2006.3.2. Using micro data
The previoussubsectionpresentedstylizedfacts onthe financialpositionof the corporatesector using
macro data. We now provide similar results using micro data from the Central Balance Sheet data-
base, covering more than 390,000firms between1990 and 2007. In Table 2 wepresent the debt struc-
ture of all the firms included in the database.
2 Results are not directly comparable withthose in Table 1
as there are differences in coverage, valuation principles and definition of some variables, as already
mentioned.
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Table 2
DEBT DECOMPOSITION AND LEVERAGE OF THE PORTUGUESE CORPORATE SECTOR
Central Balance Sheet sample
Debt decomposition of the total sample
(% of total debt)
























1990 50.7 6.5 22.5 19.5 32.1 25.7 1.8
1991 49.8 5.8 22.4 21.3 30.6 25.4 1.7
1992 50.4 5.6 21.4 22.1 30.8 25.6 1.7
1993 56.3 5.1 18.0 20.1 30.4 26.4 0.6
1994 48.5 7.8 18.6 24.6 26.6 19.1 0.4
1995 49.3 8.0 22.9 19.3 27.1 18.9 0.3
1996 49.4 6.7 24.6 18.7 29.5 20.8 1.3
1997 50.1 8.0 23.4 18.0 29.5 21.4 2.2
1998 49.2 9.1 23.8 17.3 27.3 20.0 3.5
1999 51.6 11.8 19.6 16.5 29.8 21.6 4.6
2000 59.9 6.8 18.0 14.7 29.8 19.1 7.3
2001 62.1 5.7 17.4 14.0 32.0 20.1 7.0
2002 62.3 6.1 17.0 14.0 32.3 21.0 7.2
2003 60.9 6.5 16.9 15.1 31.7 21.4 7.4
2004 61.2 8.2 16.3 13.6 32.3 21.5 6.9
2005 57.1 5.9 18.5 17.5 32.1 21.4 6.8
2006 56.5 7.8 17.7 17.4 33.8 23.3 5.3
2007 57.1 7.9 17.0 17.2 34.2 23.1 5.1
Total 56.9 7.3 18.4 16.7 31.9 21.5 4.0
Number of observations 1 331 253 1 331 253 1 331 253 1 331 253 1 331 253 350 212 350 212
Number of firms 391 327 391 327 391 327 391 327 391 327 52 825 52 825
Median number of years a firm is
in the sample 3333 399
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database).
Notes:Weightedaveragesexceptforthelastcolumnwhichreportsmedianvalues.(a)ItincludesloansgrantedbyotherfirmsinthesamegroupandAccountsPayabletosuppliersoffixed
assets. (b) It considers only Accounts Payable (excluding suppliers of fixed assets). (c) Reduced sample after the application of filters.
(2) As previously mentioned, from 2005 onwards the dataset includes all firms operating in Portugal. 4443333333333333222 2
(3) For instance, debt within the group is considered as loans for national financial accounts purposes. Leasing contracts are generally considered as trade
credit (debt to suppliers) in the Central Balance Sheet, whereas they are classified as loans in the national financial accounts. Finally, there are several
differences in the measurement of firms’ equity. 5554444444444444333 3We observe that bank loans are the main source of external finance for the companies included in the
sample, accounting for more than 55 per cent of total debt. This observation is consistent with the evi-
dence provided in Table 1 based on financial accounts. Trade credit accounts for slightlyless than one
fifth of firms’debt, though its importance has declined during the sample period. Debt securities repre-
sentasmalleramountoffirms’debt(lessthan10percent),evenforthelargerfirmsinthesample,thus
illustrating the low importance of raising funding in debt markets for Portuguese firms.
Whereasfor comparisonbetweenfinancialaccounts andthe CentralBalanceSheetdatabaseit is rea-
sonable to consider all firms in the database, in order to obtain non-spurious regression results we
need to apply some filters to the data. First, we remove from the dataset observations with a negative
value of assets and observations with a zero number of employees. We also remove observations for
which there are less than two consecutive years of data and with no information on firm foundation
date.
4 Moreover, to winsorize the dataset from spurious outlier observations, we delete observations
below(and above) the 1st (99th) percentilefor some relevant variables.We end up witha total number
of more than 350,000 observations for the period from 1990 to 2007. These observations correspond
to about 52,000 firms. On average, we observe firms for 9 years.
Table 2 also displays summary statistics for the leverage ratio, defined as bank loans and bonds as a
percentage of total assets. When the wholesample is considered,the leverageratio is, on average,32
percent, havingremainedrelativelystableduringthe sampleperiod.Whenonlythe reducedsampleis
considered, after applying the above-mentioned filters, the leverage ratio decreases to around 22 per
cent. Moreover, the median values for this sub-sample are much lower, standing at 4 per cent.
We created four classes of firms with different sizes by taking into account the value of sales and the
number of employees (firm size definitions are presented in Table 3). Most of the firms in the sample
are micro firms, havingless than 10 employeesand less than 2 millioneuros in turnover. As it wouldbe
expected, most of these firms do not use external finance, more specifically bonds and bank loans.
The median leverage ratio for these firms is zero during the sample period. Small firms also represent
a significant part of the sample. Their median leverage ratio stands at 8 per cent, referring almost ex-
clusively to bank loans. Medium-sized firms are the most leveraged (their median leverage ratio is 14
per cent). Finally, large firms showa slightlylowermedian leverage ratio (12 per cent). Most bonds are
issued by this last group of firms.
Wealsogroupedfirms accordingto theirage.The averageageof afirm inthisdatasetis 16years.The
percentile 10 of the variable age corresponds to 3 years, that is, 10 per cent of the observations corre-
spond to firms withless than 3 years.On the other hand, the percentile90 correspondsto firms with34
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Table 3
CHARACTERIZATION OF DATA BY FIRM SIZE
Number of
employees (E)








Micro E  10 S  2 171 953 38 185 0.0
Small 10  E  50 2  S  10 118 688 26 828 8.1
Medium 50  E  250 10  S  50 47 088 9 409 14.0
Large E  250 S  50 12 479 2 063 12.1
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database).
Note: The sum of the column with the number of firms is higher than 52 000 as firms changed from one class size to another.
(4) Thesefilters,mostnotablythefoundationdate,minimizethebreakinseriesfrom2005onwards,giventhatmostofthefirmsincludedinthenewinformation
reporting system do not report their foundation date. 6665555555555555444 4years. We defined four age classes according to the percentiles 25, 50 and 75 (see Table 4). We ob-
serve that leverage seems to be (non-linearly) increasing with firm age.
Finally, we also examine differences between economic sectors (Table 5), observing that the most le-
veraged sectors (taking into account median values) are real estate firms (18.7 per cent), followed by
utilities (8.5), mining firms (7.4) and construction (5.4). Given that banks are heavily exposed to some
of thesesectors, thesehighleverageratiosmayhaveanegativeimpact oncreditrisk, thoughtheanal-
ysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this work.
4. LEVERAGE REGRESSIONS
The main objective of this study is to evaluate which of the two most relevant capital structure theories
better explains the capital structure decisions of Portuguese firms. On the one hand, according to the
trade-off theory, firms balance the benefits of debt, such as tax benefits and lower agency costs of eq-
uity, withthe costs of debt, such as bankruptcycosts. The optimal amount of leverageoccurs whenthe
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Table 4
CHARACTERIZATION OF DATA BY FIRM AGE
Age class Firm age in number of years (Y) Number of observations Leverage (median)
1 Y  7 77 363 0.0
2 7  Y  13 86 194 3.8
3 13  Y  22 94 029 6.0
4 Y  22 92 622 5.8
Table 5




Agriculture 11 174 14.4 5.2
Commerce 82 102 12.4 5.0
Construction 48 999 14.9 5.4
Education 1 393 13.4 4.4
Fishing 1 099 14.2 4.9
Health 1 867 12.2 2.5
Manufacturing 142 155 11.9 5.1
Mining 3 697 13.2 7.4
Other 2 679 10.9 1.2
Other services 10 183 11.4 1.6
Real estate 3 716 25.3 18.7
Tourism 7 580 12.3 0.0
Transports 28 793 7.0 -
Utilities 1 269 19.3 8.5
Total 346 706
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database).
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database).marginal benefit of debt equals its marginal cost. As discussed in Section 2, this theory predicts that
more profitable firms should have higher leverage ratios. On the other hand, the pecking order theory
does not predict the existence of a target leverage ratio. Following this theory, firms would issue debt
onlyifinvestmentfinancingneedsexceedtheirinternallygeneratedfunds.Empirically,thisshouldlead
to results opposite from those predicted by the trade off theory. More profitable firms should be less in-
debted, as they do not need to finance as much of their activity with outside financing. Moreover, firms
engaging in larger investment projects should have larger leverage ratios.
We beginbyanalysingthe determinants of the leverageratio. This analysisprovidesa directtest of the
pecking order, but it does not make it possible to establish clear conclusions regarding the trade-off
theory. In order to analysethe latter, weempiricallytest whetherfirms adjust their leverage ratios in or-
der to converge to a target ratio.
4.1. Explaining the leverage ratios










it t it         12 3 .
Our dependent variable is
D
A it
, the leverage ratio, defined as bonds and loans as a percentage of total
assets. The main variable of interest to test the pecking order theory is
CF
A it
, whichis computed as net
earningsbeforeprovisionsanddepreciation,scaledbyfirms’assets.
5Thecoefficient2 willplayacen-
tral role in testing the pecking order theory, given that only if it assumes negative (and significant) val-
ues there will be evidence in favour of this theory.
In order to accurately estimate 2, we need to control for relevant firm characteristics which may also
affect firms’ leverage. The vector Xit refers to this set of control variables, which includes Sales
Growth,TangibleAssets/Assets, Assets, Group Dummy, Liquidity, R&D Dummyand, finally, Deprecia-
tions and Provisions. All these variables are firm-specific and time-varying. Sales growth is the
year-on-yearchangeof sales, whichis includedin the regressionsto control for firm’s growth.Tangible
Assets/Assets, the share of tangible assets in total assets, controls for the asset structure of the firm,
and also for the collateral potentially available for debt contracts. Firms whose assets are mostly com-
prised of intangibles may find it harder to obtain bank financing, thus displaying lower leverage ratios.
In fact, as bankruptcycosts playa prominent role in the trade-off theory, asset tangibilityis predicted to
have a positive impact on leverage. We also consider a dummy variable which considers whether the
firm belongs to a group, as this may yield important differences in terms of capital structure decisions,
giventhepossibilityofaccesstointra-groupfunding.If afirmrecordsassetsorliabilitieswithinagroup,
then this variable takes the value one. In our regressions we also control for Liquidity, defined as
short-termsecuritiesandcashasapercentageofshort-termdebt.Anotherpotentiallyrelevantexplan-
atory variable is the R&D Dummy, whichtakes the value one wheneverthe firm records some R&D in-
vestment. This variable can be taken as a proxy for expected investment opportunities. In addition,
together with the variable Depreciation, it also serves as a proxy for non-debt tax shields. In fact, ex-
penditures on depreciations and provisions, which have important fiscal implications for firms, may
also conditioncapital structure decisions.Thus, wealso control for depreciationsand provisions,mea-
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(5) Alternatively,itwouldbepossibletouseaprofitabilitymeasure,suchasnetearningsoverassets.Theresultsobtainedaresimilartothoseresultingfromthe
cash-flow ratio. 7776666666666666555 5sured as a percentage of total assets. Finally, given the apparent importance of firm size on leverage
ratios, we use the logarithm of assets as a control variable as well. Moreover, in all regressions
presented we control for time and firm fixed effects.
In Table 6 we present a brief statistical description of the variables considered in this analysis and in
Table 7 we include a correlation matrix of the same variables.
Table 8 presents our first regression results. In the first column wepresent the results for a simple esti-
mation, in which we consider as explanatory variable only the cash-flow ratio, which is our main vari-
able of interest. We control, as in all other regressions, for time and firm fixed effects. We obtain a
significant negative coefficient for cash flow. This preliminary result seems to be in favour of the peck-
ingordertheory:firmswithmoreavailablefundswilluselessexternalfundingthanothercompanies.
However, this specificationis clearlyinsufficient for more definiteconclusionsto be reached,giventhat
several other firm characteristics are also likelyto be important in explainingleverage ratios. Hence, in
the second column of Table 8 wepresent another regression, in whichweinclude the control variables
specified above: Sales Growth, Tangible Assets/Assets, Assets, Group Dummy, Liquidity, R&D
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N Mean sd min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max
Leverage 346 706 12.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 20.3 47.8 81.5
CF_A 343 204 6.8 12.9 -71.4 -13.1 2.1 6.5 12.7 26.7 52.7
Inv_A 343 204 5.9 9.7 -11.2 0.0 0.0 1.8 7.4 27.1 59.3
Sales growth 269 933 8.0 43.1 -100.0 -46.5 -10.0 3.5 18.8 73.4 364.3
Tangible assets 350 208 26.8 23.7 0.0 0.3 6.8 20.6 41.6 74.9 128.6
Log assets 350 208 13.2 2.0 1.6 10.1 11.8 13.1 14.5 16.7 23.4
D_group 350 208 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Liquidity 340 507 56.1 160.4 0.0 0.3 3.0 11.0 37.6 244.8 1941.8
D_RD 350 208 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Dep_prov_A 346 706 6.3 6.0 0.0 0.1 2.0 4.7 8.9 18.5 35.4
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database).
Notes: Leverage is defined as bonds and loans over total assets. CF_A is net earnings before provisions and depreciation as a percentage of assets. Inv_A stands for investment as a
percentageofassetsandTang_assetsistheshareoftangibleassetsintotalassets.D_groupisadummyvariablewhichtakesthevalueonewhenthefirmhasdebttoorfromotherfirms
inthegroup.Liquiditydefinedasshorttermsecuritiesandcashasapercentage ofshorttermdebt.D_RDisadummyvariablewhichtakesthevalueonewheneverthefirmhasinvested
in R&D. Dep_prov_A is depreciations and provisions for the year as a percentage of total assets.
Table 7
CORRELATION MATRIX












Inv_A -0.0149* 0.2033* 1
Sales growth -0.0173* 0.1807* 0.1386* 1
Tangible assets 0.0450* 0.1513* 0.3977* 0.0416* 1
Log assets 0.3195* -0.0026 -0.0315* 0.0026 0.0246* 1
D_group 0.1233* -0.0231* -0.0406* -0.0183* 0.0138* 0.4801* 1
Liquidity -0.1523* 0.0909* -0.0498* -0.0234* -0.0652* -0.1480* -0.0609* 1
D_RD 0.1399* 0.0071* 0.0475* -0.0022 0.1082* 0.3640* 0.2451* -0.0618* 1
Dep_prov_A -0.0355* 0.2881* 0.0779* 0.0064* 0.1243* -0.1047* -0.0271* 0.0002 -0.0089* 1
Source: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database).
Notes: * indicates that the correlation is significant at the 5 per cent level. All variables as defined in Table 6.Dummy and Depreciation. The results obtained with this specification are consistent with those ob-
tained with the previous simple regression, as the coefficient associated with cash flow is hardly af-
fected by the change in specification, remaining negative and statistically very significant.
The coefficients obtainedfor thecontrolvariablesareallstatisticallysignificantat 5 percent(exceptfor
the Group Dummy). First, firms with stronger sales growth show lower leverage ratios, even though
this effect is very small. If this variable is seen as a proxy for growth opportunities, this negative coeffi-
cient is consistent with the trade-off theory, as risk tends to be higher for these firms, pushing up bank-
ruptcy costs. However, it is also consistent with the complex view of the pecking order theory, which
argues that firms would rather maintain some debt capacity to avoid foregoing future investments or
havingtofinancethemwithnewriskysecurities.Firms withmoretangibleassets(andhencewithmore
collateral potentially available for credit) are also more indebted than other firms, as the trade-off the-
ory predicts. Firm size seems to be extremely important in explaining leverage ratios, as larger firms
show much higher leverage ratios than other firms, other firm characteristics being controlled for. This
is consistent withthe viewthat larger firms tend to be more diversified and, hence, less volatile, as dis-
cussed by Fama and French (2002). We also observe that firms belonging to a group depend less on
external debt, as would be expected, even though this effect is only statistically significant at a 10 per-
centlevel.Firms withstrongerliquiditybuffersarealsolessindebted.Incontrast,weobservethatfirms
engaging in R&D activities show higher leverage ratios than others. Finally, firms with more significant
depreciations and provisions, as a percentage of their assets, also record higher leverage ratios. This
effect does not comply with the predictions of the trade-off theory.
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Baseline regressions Lagged variables
CF_A -0.12 -0.15 -0.09
-51.70 -46.89 -25.67
Sales growth - -0.004 -0.0005
- -6.22 -0.61
Tangible assets - 0.03 0.03
- 11.07 10.83
Log assets - 4.46 3.39
- 56.86 35.38
D_group - -0.23 -0.08
- -1.88 -0.62
Liquidity - -0.003 -0.002
- -17.62 -7.28
D_RD - 0.43 0.41
- 4.49 3.89
Dep_prov_A - 0.03 0.00
- 3.74 -0.44
Constant 10.10 -47.77 -32.91
55.12 -44.27 -26.29
Number of observations 340 103 255 122 189 067
Number of firms 52 451 50 467 36 067
R
2:
within 0.030 0.062 0.035
between 0.021 0.135 0.123
overall 0.027 0.117 0.106
Sources: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database) and authors’ calculations.
Notes:t-ratiosinitalics.Timeandfirmfixed-effectsandrobuststandarderrorsareconsidered.Leverageisdefinedasbondsandloansovertotalassets.AllvariablesasdefinedinTable6.Nevertheless,the results for this secondspecificationmaybe affected bysimultaneityissues. In fact, it
is possible that there are some unobserved time-varying variables which simultaneously affect the le-
verage ratio and other firm-specific variables, thus leading to potential endogeneityproblems. In order
to minimize this potential problem, we consider an alternative specification, in which all explanatory
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This specification is presented in the last column of Table 8. The estimated coefficient for cash-flowre-
mains consistent withthat previouslyobserved: firms withmore available funds are less indebted than
other firms, controlling for other relevant firm characteristics, thus providing evidence in favour of the
pecking order theory. As regards the other firm control variables, there are some differences worthno-
ticing. In particular, Sales Growth and Depreciations are no longer statistically significant at a 5 per
cent level. For all other control variables, the results are generally consistent with those observed in
the previous specification.
Our results are broadlyconsistent withthose obtained by Fama and French (2002). These authors es-
timate a model similar to equation (1) without considering firm-level fixed effects. We consider that the
inclusionoffirm-levelfixedeffectsiscrucialastheycontrolfortimeinvariantunobservedheterogeneity
at the firm level. These authors obtain negativecoefficients on profitability, thus supportingthe pecking
order theory.
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the determinants of firm leverage may be
considerablydifferentdependingonfirms’sizeandage.In orderto betterexplorethesepossiblediffer-
ences, we estimate the regression with all explanatory variables lagged by one year for different size




remains negative and statistically significant regardless of firm size.
This result continues to give support to the pecking order hypothesis. Moreover, we observe that this
coefficient becomes larger, in absolute value, as firm size increases, thus suggesting that large firms
with more internal funds available use less external funding than comparable smaller firms. We obtain
a similar result when we estimate the regressions by firm age: older firms have a similar behaviour to
that of larger firms.
In terms of the other control variables, the results are broadly consistent with those previously ob-
tained. Sales Growth, Group Dummy and Depreciation are not significant in most specifications and
the remainingvariableshold the same signals, whensignificant.Interestingly, R&D Dummyis onlysig-
nificant for the older firms.
For robustness purposes, we also estimate the regression for different sectors. In Table 9 we present
the results for manufacturing firms, as these represent a large part of the sample used. The results are
broadly consistent with those previously obtained and there is a slight improvement in the model’s
adjustment quality.
It isimportanttonoticethatmorethan40percentofthefirmsinthesampledonotrelyeitheronbankor
market financing, thus having null leverage ratios. Given the possibility that this feature may affect the
results of the estimations, we also present in Table 9 the regression estimated only for firms with posi-
tive leverage. Interestingly, there are some differences in the determinants of leverage ratios for this




The main difference is that the liquidity ratio is no longer statistically significant, whereas Depreciation
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CF_A -0.04 -0.12 -0.21 -0.29 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 -0.010 -0.06
-9.43 -16.43 -16.21 -11.28 -2.96 -6.55 -10.46 -16.72 -21.18 -24.40 -21.20 -6.16
Sales growth 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
0.25 -1.78 -1.74 0.69 0.26 -0.45 -1.52 -0.59 0.30 0.26 1.39 -1.19
Tangible assets 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04
2.95 7.88 4.75 3.96 -1.14 5.31 3.91 4.79 9.03 4.82 19.42 10.09
Log assets 2.73 3.74 4.63 4.62 1.75 2.47 2.93 4.18 3.78 3.02 0.53 1.53
17.62 20.89 16.85 9.50 4.76 10.33 12.45 21.23 26.97 20.04 77.88 8.41
D_group -0.82 -0.15 -0.10 -0.18 -0.34 -0.52 0.44 0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 0.16
-2.14 -0.66 -0.46 -0.44 -0.49 -1.59 1.66 0.41 -0.45 -0.62 -6.67 1.24
Liquidity -0.001 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
-2.68 -6.58 -8.11 -5.58 -1.69 2.06 -2.52 -8.24 -7.49 -1.16 -31.20 0.83
D_RD 0.22 0.37 0.41 0.67 -0.16 -0.19 0.17 0.86 0.46 0.23 0.15 0.29
0.80 2.19 2.25 1.99 -0.31 -0.78 0.84 5.09 3.37 1.77 8.22 2.88
Dep_prov_A 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.02
3.37 -0.61 -1.49 0.02 0.85 -0.23 1.79 -1.81 -2.27 2.52 -5.21 -1.09
Constant -24.17 -38.10 -54.65 -57.88 -11.33 -22.46 -26.92 -45.95 -38.01 -20.81 -6.55 -17.06
-13.21 -16.13 -12.58 -7.03 -2.57 -7.44 -8.76 -16.17 -20.86 -10.19 -72.37 -7.05
Number of observations 77 877 70 037 31 839 9 314 25 953 51 606 54 426 57 082 87 053 117 954 190 557 190 557
Number of firms 19 928 15 468 6 195 1 563 12 846 16 572 13 881 10 278 14 514 26 166 36 258 36 258
R
2:
within 0.021 0.047 0.064 0.075 0.012 0.019 0.023 0.040 0.043 0.032 - 0.010
between 0.115 0.122 0.090 0.069 0.081 0.108 0.121 0.153 0.157 0.026 - 0.069
overall 0.098 0.107 0.086 0.080 0.071 0.093 0.107 0.121 0.136 0.029 - 0.047
Sources: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database) and authors’ calculations.
Notes:t-ratiosinitalics.Timeandfirmfixed-effectsandrobuststandarderrorsareconsidered.Leverageisdefinedasbondsandloansovertotalassets.AllexplanatoryvariablesareasdefinedinTable6andlaggedby1year.Thedummyleveragetakesthevalueonewhenfirmshavepositiveleverage.Longtermleveragecon-
siders long term loans and bonds as a percentage of total assets.hasnowapositivesignificantimpactonleverage.Consideringthatthedecisiononwhethertoseekex-
ternal funding or not can be made before the choice of the leverage ratio, we also estimate a discrete
choice regression to empirically analyse this preliminary decision to use external funds. In this regres-
sion, the dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value one when the firm has positive
leverage. The results are also shown in Table 9. Firms with positive leverage ratios have lower
cash-flow ratios than firms with no external funding, other characteristics being controlled for. All other
firm characteristics considered yield results consistent with those previously obtained.
Finally, we also test an alternative definition of leverage, considering only long-term bonds and bank
loans, as done by Flannery and Rangan (2006). Again, the results remain broadly consistent with
those obtained in the other specifications.
4.2. Do firms have a target leverage ratio?
As discussedinSection2, firms mayhavetargetleverageratiosto whichtheygraduallyconvergeover
time. This is a central result of the trade-off theory. In order to test whether this conclusion is valid for
the firms in our dataset, we estimate a two-step regression, in a spirit similar to that of Fama and
French (2002). In the first step, we estimate a regression as defined in equation (1). However, given
that the distribution of the leverage ratio has a clear discontinuity, with more than 40 percent of the
firms having null leverage ratios, we estimate this regression only for the firms with positive leverage.
The fittedvaluesof thisregressionareourmeasureof thetargetleverageratio.For firms withoutlever-
age, we consider that their target is zero.
6 In addition, for firms for which we obtain negative target
ratios, we replace their targets by zero.
In the second-step regression, we use the fitted values of the first-step as a proxy for the target lever-
age (TL) in a partial adjustment model. In this model, changes in leverageratios partiallyreflect the dif-
ference between firms’ target leverage and the previous year’s observed leverage ratio. We then
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measuresinvestmentexpendituresscaledbytotal assets. The estimationof this par-
tial adjustment model allows us to test the trade-off theory given that, according to this theory, firms
have target leverage ratios and move toward the target over time.
7 Hence, 2, which measures the
speed of adjustment, should be positive. However, this parameter is expected to be null if the pecking
order theoryis valid. The investment and cash-flowvariables are included to control for any short-term
movements in leverage away from the target. The results of this estimation are presented in the first
column of Table 10. The adjustment variable has a coefficient of 0.61, which means that every year
firms get 60 percent closer to their target leverage ratio. Hence, the results are clearly in favour of an
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(6) We also estimated target leverage ratios for all the firms in the sample, and the results remain robust. 888777777777777666 6
(7) Inthepresenceofacointegrationrelationship,adifferentestimationapproachshouldbefollowed.However,astheresultspresentedinTable10usemore
than 35 000 firms, observed over 5 years, on average, the stationarity and cointegration tests for panel datasets cannot benefit from the necessary
asymptotic properties. In this case, as the panel dataset has a small T and a large N, the existing panel data procedures are sufficient to consider very
general temporal correlation patterns (see Hsiao, 2003). 999888888888888777 7adjustment toward the target, thus providing evidence in favour of the trade-off theory. As financing
costs are higher for equity, the pecking order theory predicts that short-term variation in cashflow and
investments should be absorbed by variations in debt, which is exactly what we observe. Our results
are consistent with the ones in Fama and French (2002) although their speed of adjustment is much
smaller than ours.
Given the discontinuity in the distribution of leverage ratios, we estimate the same regression only for
firms with positive leverage. Results are presented in the second column of Table 10. The results ob-
tained are perfectly consistent with the ones for the full sample.
Furthermore, given that firm size may be associated with different adjustment capabilities, we run the
second step regression for different firm size groups. Interestingly, we observe that there are indeed
differentadjustmentspeeds.Infact,smallerfirmsareabletoadjustmuchfastertotheirtargetleverage
ratio. The adjustment variable has a coefficient of 0.75 for micro firms and of only 0.33 for large firms.
8
This adjustment pattern mayhelp to explainthe differences betweenour results and those obtainedby
Fama and French (2002), given that their dataset covers only large firms.
Moreover, we also consider the possibility of differences between two adjustment paths. In fact, firms
can either increase or decrease their leverage in order to achieve their target ratio. We observe that
firms which have a negative adjustment (i.e., their target is below their current leverage) are able to
reach their target faster than firms that have to increase leverage. This result seems to suggest the ex-
istence of financial constraints in issuing new financial liabilities, as well as relatively high flexibility in
decreasing leverage.
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Sources: Banco de Portugal (Central Balance Sheet database) and authors’ calculations.
Notes:t-ratiosinitalics.Timeandfirmfixed-effectsandrobuststandarderrorsareconsidered.AllvariablesasdefinedinTable6.“D.”correspondstothefirstdifferenceofthevariable.
Table 10
TARGET LEVERAGE RATIO: TWO-STEP REGRESSIONS



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Adjustment 0.61 0.62 0.75 0.61 0.49 0.33 0.48 0.71
152.21 127.31 100.11 97.01 62.44 26.34 92.29 72.82
D.CF_A t -0.084 -0.178 -0.049 -0.112 -0.189 -0.225 -0.053 -0.181
-34.24 -35.86 -16.22 -22.55 -20.64 -11.99 -25.09 -21.35
D.CF_A t-1 -0.024 -0.048 -0.007 -0.028 -0.066 -0.087 -0.019 -0.049
-10.89 -10.34 -2.64 -6.19 -7.92 -5.22 -9.91 -6.30
Inv_A t 0.037 0.055 0.034 0.029 0.053 0.083 0.063 -0.038
11.90 10.81 7.67 5.49 5.92 3.80 19.68 -4.29
Inv_A t-1 0.023 0.033 0.015 0.025 0.048 0.070 0.022 0.055
8.44 7.62 3.91 5.54 6.28 3.88 7.93 7.35
Constant -0.92 -0.62 0.34 -1.04 -1.25 -3.55 -2.45 5.11
-6.31 -3.21 1.27 -4.65 -6.76 -7.82 -16.90 13.49
Number of observations 183 783 113 669 75 246 68 268 31135 9 134 127 966 55 817
Number of firms 35 427 25 502 19 341 15 199 6 121 1 554 30 277 19 811
(8) We conducted the same exercise but estimating target leverage ratios in separate regressions according to firm size. The results remain consistent. 10101099999999999988 8An alternative empirical strategy to test whetherfirms converge towarda target leverage ratio consists
in using a one-step procedure as in Flannery and Rangan (2006). These authors compare different
methodologies and argue that adding the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the
equationiscrucialandthatasimplecross-sectionalregressionappearsto omitthisimportantvariable.
In addition, unlike Fama and French (2002), they do not estimate the model in two stages. Instead of
using the model in equation (1) to generate a leverage target proxy and then use this proxy in a partial
adjustment model, they estimate the partial adjustment model in just one step. They believe the
two-stage estimation helps explaining the low speed of adjustment found in other works. We proceed
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whereXit1 consists of the set of control variables used in the previous subsection. In order to estimate
this regression, we use a fixed effects dynamic panel data model, with the Arellano-Bond (1991) esti-
mator, using difference equations. The results are presented in Table 11. There is a clear persistence
of leverageratiosovertime, confirmingthehypothesisthat firms convergeto anendogenouslydefined
target leverage ratio. The coefficients for the control variables are consistent with those obtained
before.
However, to accurately test the two main theories proposed in the literature, we need to add another
variable to the regressions. This additional variable, whichwe call financial deficit, measures the fund-
ing needs of firms for investment and is defined as the sum of the change in working capital and of in-
vestment, less the cash-flow generated by the firm (all scaled by firms’ assets) as in Frank and Goyal
(2003). Firms with a larger financial deficit willlikely need to rely more on external funding. In column 2
we present the results for this estimation. The results obtained continue to suggest a strong adjust-
ment towardtarget leverageratios. The financialdeficit is not statisticallysignificant, contraryto the re-
sults obtained by Flannery and Rangan (2006), who observe a positive and significant coefficient.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we propose to empirically test the two most prominent theories of capital structure, the
pecking order and the trade-off theories. In order to do so, we explore the information contained in the
PortugueseCentralBalanceSheet.Weobservethatbanksarethemostimportantsourceoflong-term
debt for Portuguese non-financial corporations, as access to market funding is to some extent limited
to larger firms.
In this paper, we followed two distinct empirical strategies. First, we estimated a simple panel data re-
gression, with time and firm fixed effects, using as dependent variable firms’ leverage ratio. By using
the cash flow as an explanatoryvariable, we are able to test some of the predictions of the pecking or-
der theory. According to this theory, firms with more available internal funds should have less external
funding. The results obtained with these estimations are broadly consistent with these predictions.
However, this simple regression does not allow us to test the trade-off model.
Second, in order to be able to also test the predictions of the trade-off theory, we follow a complemen-
taryroute. We estimate models of partial adjustment, to verifyto whatextent firms adjust their debt to a
target leverage ratio. We observe that this adjustment exists and, whencompared withother empirical
studies, seems to be very strong. Hence, these results are supportive of the trade-off theory.
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16The results obtained with these two different strategies are not necessarily contradictory, as they may
reflect decisions made in different time horizons. This issue needs to be further explored in future
research.
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